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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Although Julie Matlin liked the shoes she saw on Zappos.com, she
ultimately left the site without purchasing them.1 However, it was not the
last time she would see that pair of shoes.2 For the next several days, the
shoes followed Ms. Matlin to numerous other websites.3 “It was as if
Zappos had unleashed a persistent salesmen who wouldn’t take no for an
answer.”4 Understandably, Ms. Matlin found this “online stalking”
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Miguel Helft & Tanzina Vega, Retargeting Ads Follow Surfers to Other Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/technology/30adstalk.html.
2

See id.

3

Id.

4

Id.
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disturbing, but she was more troubled when ads for her online dieting
service started following her as well.5 She stated, “They are still following
me around, and it makes me feel fat.”6
[2]
The ads that followed Ms. Matlin around the Internet are a form of
online behavioral advertising called retargeting.7 Online behavioral
advertising refers to the collection, use, and distribution of data about
consumers’ online activities in order to place advertisements that
correspond to each consumer’s interests.8 Retargeting, however, merely
connects advertisers with past website visitors to entice those visitors to
complete their online transactions or purchases.9 Though retargeting is
not as invasive as traditional methods of behavioral advertising, it is often
more disconcerting to consumers because it is more obvious.10

5

See id.

6

Helft & Vega, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).

7

See id.; Isaac Scarborough, Behavioral Retargeting 101, IMEDIACONNECTION (July 7,
2006), http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/10276.asp.
8

FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009) [hereinafter FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf;
Richard
Raysman & Peter Brown, Developments in Online Behavioral Advertising, LAW.COM,
June
8,
2010,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=
1202460986288&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
9

See Scarborough, supra note 7.

10

See Helft & Vega, supra note 1 (“As [behavioral] tracking gets more and more crass
and obvious, consumers will rightfully become more concerned about it.” (quoting
Michael Learmonth, The Pants That Stalked Me on the Web, ADVERTISING AGE, Aug. 2,
2010, http://adage.com/digitalnext/post?articleid=145204) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Retargeting relies on the placement of a cookie on a user’s computer; thus, “if
a user refuses or deletes cookies, they simply won't be exposed to retargeted ads.” Hollis
Thomases, Retargeting Gains Traction, Part 2, CLICKZ (May 9, 2006),
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/1696600/retargeting-gains-traction-part.

2
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[3]
For more than a decade, consumers and privacy advocates have
sought to increase consumer privacy protections online through lawsuits11
and calls for regulation.12 Many argue it is still too early for legislation.13
However, the recent introduction of multiple privacy bills in the
legislature displays a congressional belief that the online advertising
industry is now ripe for formal regulation.14
11

Most litigation involving online behavioral advertising has been brought under Title I
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)
(“Wiretap Act”), Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2701-2711 (2006) (“Stored Communications Act”), and the Computer Fraud & Abuse
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”). To date, most of these actions have been unsuccessful.
See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500, 510-11
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a lawsuit because website operators authorized DoubleClick
to collect data about consumers who viewed their websites).
12

For example, many consumer groups support the creation of a Do-Not-Track list
similar to the Do-Not-Call registry, which would allow consumers to choose whether to
let advertisers collect information about their online activities. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,
FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING—CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER PAMELA JONES HARBOUR 5
n.11
(2009)
[hereinafter
HARBOUR
CONCURRENCE],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadharbour.pdf. However, a Do-Not-Track
list would differ from the Do-Not-Call registry in one key respect: “consumers who sign
up for the [Do Not Call] registry are able to avoid . . . all telemarketing calls at home.”
Wendy Davis, Without Legislation, FTC’s Do-Not-Track System Lacks Mandate, THE
DAILY ONLINE EXAMINER (Nov. 10, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/
publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=139324 [hereinafter Davis, Do-NotTrack Lacks Mandate]. By contrast, a Do-Not-Track list would not prevent advertisers
from sending ads to individual consumers online; instead, it would only stop behavioral
advertisers from “trailing people online and delivering ads based on users’ [w]eb
history[ies].” Davis, Do-Not-Track Lacks Mandate, supra.
13

See, e.g., HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that regulation of
behavioral advertising is “not prudent at this time.”); see also Robert Todd Graham
Collins, Note, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection Technology: Why the
Next Wave in Online Advertising Shouldn’t Rock the Self-Regulatory Boat, 44 GA. L.
REV. 545, 551 (2010) (“[A] knee-jerk reaction instituting new . . . online information
privacy legislation would be misguided given the essential features of the Internet and the
likely future of online advertising.”).
14

See The BEST PRACTICES Act, and the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft:
Hearing on H.R. 5777 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot. of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R. 5777] (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy &

3
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[4]
In 2010, Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns released a
discussion draft of privacy legislation (“Boucher-Stearns Privacy
Discussion Draft” or “the Draft”).15 The Draft proposed to regulate the
collection and use of consumer information, both on and offline.16 Shortly
thereafter, Representative Bobby Rush introduced a bill, entitled the
“Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility Accountability
Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards
Act” or “BEST PRACTICES Act,” which had a similar purpose.17
Though these bills were certainly not the first efforts to provide additional
legal protection to consumers regarding the collection and use of their
personal data online, they are a recent display of the series of efforts by
Congress to ensure that privacy legislation is enacted in the near future.18
[5]
Considering this proposed legislation in light of the SelfRegulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising issued by the

Commerce) (describing the need for privacy legislation that will “provide consumers
with more control over their personal information and foster more responsible data
collection practices by companies.”); Press Release, Cong. Rep. Bobby L. Rush,
Subcommittee Chairman Bobby L. Rush Fights for[ ]Consumer Privacy and Prot. of Pers.
Info. Introduces the BEST PRACTICES ACT of 2010 (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.house.gov/list/press/il01_rush/pr_100719_best_practices_act.shtml; see also
Learmonth, supra note 10 (stating that retargeting reflects the online advertising
industry’s lack of concern about privacy legislation).
15

Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, Stearns, Boucher Release Discussion Draft of
Privacy Legislation (May 4, 2010), available at http://stearns.house.gov/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=183894.
16

See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(4), 111th Cong. (as published by H.
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft),
available at http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf
(stating the bill’s goal is “[t]o require notice to and consent of an individual prior to the
collection and disclosure of certain personal information relating to that individual”).
17

See The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010).
18

See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (as
reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 22, 2009).

4
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Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)19 and recent FTC enforcement
actions,20 this Article argues that the advertising industry’s reaction to the
proposed legislation has already expanded the FTC’s ability to use its
enforcement authority. In fact, the threat of legislation is already changing
the way online advertisers do business.21 More specifically, the online
advertising industry has established new compliance and education
programs, which will provide more transparency and control to consumers
about online behavioral advertising.22
[6]
Consequently, despite promises that recently-introduced privacy
bills will provide additional protection to consumers, these bills will likely
do nothing more than maintain the status quo. This Article demonstrates
that the self-regulatory actions (or reactions) of the online advertising
industry bring online behavioral advertising within the FTC’s authority to
attack “deceptive practices” under § 5 of the FTC Act.23 Thus, the FTC’s
ability to protect consumer privacy online through enforcement actions
against online advertisers makes the proposed legislation unnecessary, and
ultimately too premature to result in the meaningful privacy protections
they seek to provide.
[7]
Part II of this Article describes consumers’ attitudes toward online
privacy, and provides background on online behavioral advertising,
including what it is, how it works, and how companies obtain consent to
collect consumers’ data. Part III evaluates the FTC’s enforcement
authority and its current framework of self-regulation. In addition, this
Part analyzes two reports released by the FTC and Department of
Commerce (“Commerce”), which offer new frameworks for increasing
19

See infra Part III.B (describing the FTC’s Self-Regulatory Principles for Online
Behavioral Advertising).
20

See infra Parts III.A.1, II.A.2 (outlining two recent FTC enforcement actions against
online service providers).
21

See infra Part IV.B (discussing the changes in the advertising industry’s standard
practices in light of recent legislative action by Congress).
22

See infra Part IV.B (discussing the advertising industry’s reaction to proposed privacy
legislation).
23

15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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consumer privacy. Finally, Part IV examines the proposed privacy
legislation and the online advertising industry’s response, ultimately
concluding that the industry’s response to the potential legislation expands
the FTC’s ability to bring enforcement actions against online behavioral
advertisers and renders the proposed legislation virtually meaningless.
II. BACKGROUND
[8]
Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren were the first to articulate a
common law right to privacy.24 They argued that “the right to be let
alone” was necessary to protect individuals from invasions of privacy that
resulted from new technologies.25 More than a century later, their concern
is still valid. The proliferation of the Internet has brought with it many
new legal challenges, and one need only look to the popular press to find
that behavioral advertising and online consumer privacy are chief among
them.26
A. Consumer Attitudes About Online Privacy
[9]
Despite the media attention devoted to the issue of online privacy,
some argue that society no longer recognizes an individual’s right to
privacy.27 Notably, Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, believes that
privacy, particularly among young adults, is “no longer a social norm”
24

See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890).
25

See id. at 193-96 (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society.”). In fact, Brandeis and Warren wrote their article based on a concern that the
rise of newspapers and the invention of “instantaneous photographs” (e.g., Polaroids)
would compromise individuals’ rights to keep aspects of their lives private. See id. at
195-96.
26

See, e.g., What They Know Series, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/page/
what-they-know-digital-privacy.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
27

See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 11, 2010, 9:58 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.

6
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because “[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more
information [of] different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”28
However, recent empirical studies suggest that this characterization of
consumer attitudes about online privacy is inaccurate.29
[10] For example, in April 2010, the University of California Berkeley
and University of Pennsylvania jointly released the results of an empirical
study, in which they found that young adults in the United States are as
concerned about online privacy as older adults.30 The real disparity
between young adults and their older counterparts was that younger
consumers believed, incorrectly, that the law provides a strong degree of
protection for their privacy both on and offline.31 Similarly, a Zogby poll
showed that most teens understand that search engines and social networks
track their online activity, and demonstrated that they, like most adults,
wanted more control over the collection of their personal information.32
[11] Despite the public’s desire for more control over their personal
data, it is often argued that people should not be concerned about privacy
unless they have something to hide.33 Scholars describe this “nothing to
28

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Although social media raises different privacy
concerns than behavioral targeting, when companies use social media to collect
information about consumers’ online activity, they should abide by the same
self-regulatory principles as traditional online advertisers. See Melissa Landau Steinman
& Mikhia Hawkins, When Marketing Through Social Media, Legal Risks Can Go Viral,
22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. no. 8, 2010 at 1, 7; infra Part III.B.
29

Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 20 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished
research study), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1589864; Austin Carr, Teens Want More Privacy Online Too, FASTCOMPANY.COM, Oct.
7, 2010, http://www.fastcompany.com/1693718/teens-want-more-privacy-controls-poll.
30

Hoofnagle et al., supra note 29, at 3.

31

Id. at 4, 17-19.

32

See Carr, supra note 29.

33

Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,
44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 746-47 (2007).

7
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hide argument” as an “all-too-common refrain” and the “most common
retort against privacy advocates.”34 Moreover, this view fails to recognize
that “real” problems result from a widespread perception that individuals
have no right to be free from intrusion by business and government
entities.35 As Professor Daniel J. Solove argues, harms that result from a
lack of privacy “need not be physical or emotional” and “can occur by
chilling socially beneficial behavior (for example, free speech and
association) . . . .”36 Similarly, Professor Julie Cohen argues that the First
Amendment includes an implicit “right to read anonymously” on the
Internet.37 However, although these concerns about privacy are valid and
publicly supported,38 they must be balanced against the broad First
Amendment protections for commercial speech (i.e., advertising),39
particularly when applied in the context of the Internet and other new
technologies.
B. What is Behavioral Advertising and How Does It Work?
[12] Behavioral advertising is the collection of data regarding consumer
activity online, which allows a marketer to focus advertisements on each

34

Id. at 747 (quoting Bruce Schneier, Commentary, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED
(May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/
2006/05/70886; Geoffrey R. Stone, Editorial, Freedom and Public Responsibility, CHI.
TRIB., May 21, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-05-21/news/0605210386_
1_phone-records-nsa-freedoms).
35

See Solove, supra note 33, at 764.

36

Id. at 758.

37

Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 982, 1003-15 (1996) (“[R]eading is
so intimately connected with speech and freedom of thought that the First Amendment
should be understood to guarantee such a right.”).
38

See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.

39

See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996)
(“Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial
days, the public relied on ‘commercial speech’ for vital information about the market.”).

8
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customer’s personal interests.40 This practice uses technology to increase
the value of each marketing impression by “plac[ing] the right ad before
the right person at the right time.”41 Moreover, the tailored advertisements
that consumers receive because of behavioral advertising are the “quid pro
quo” of free services they have access to online.42
[13] There are two common forms of behavioral advertising.43 The first
type, contextual or first-party marketing, occurs when an advertiser itself
uses information about the particular website a consumer is viewing to
determine what type of ad to display.44 Contextual advertising typically
does not require the collection or retention of customer data.45 For
example, if a consumer views an article about Fashion Week on a news
website, an advertisement for a high-end clothing store might appear next
to the story she is reading. While the FTC does not actively support this
form of advertising, it is generally regarded as less invasive than the
alternative.46

40

See FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2; Raysman & Brown,
supra note 8.
41

Peter Brown, Behavioral Marketing, PRACTISING L. INST., Apr.-May 2010, available at
1001 PLI/Pat 227, 229 (Westlaw).
42

See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 194 (2005). John Battelle
describes data collection about consumers’ online activity as a “Database of Intentions,”
which includes “the aggregate results of every search ever entered, every result list ever
tendered, and every path taken as a result.” Id. at 6.
43

Susan E. Gindin, Perfect Storm for Behavioral Advertising: How the Confluence of
Four Events in 2009 May Hasten Legislation (and What this Means for Companies
Which Use Behavioral Advertising), ISAACSON ROSENBAUM P.C., 1 (Nov. 2009),
[hereinafter Gindin, Perfect Storm], available at http://ir-law.com/files/3166_Gindin_
BehavAdvertising_.pdf.
44

FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at iii.

45

Id.

46

Id.; Gindin, Perfect Storm, supra note 43, at 1.
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[14] The second form of behavioral advertising involves placement of a
“cookie” on the consumer’s computer.47 A cookie is a program that, when
placed on a consumer’s hard drive, collects information about the user,
including usernames, search terms, and passwords.48 “Cookies are, by
design . . . largely invisible to consumers and encrypted to be
unintelligible to any user wanting to know what the cookies are saying
about him or her.”49 As a result, consumers often are unaware that
advertisers are tracking their online activities.50 Moreover, cookies are
more invasive than contextual advertising, which tracks only consumers’
action on a particular website, because cookies monitor consumers’
movements across multiple websites within an ad network and record
information they type into search boxes and online registration forms.51
[15] There are two classes of cookies: browser-based and Flash
cookies.52 Consumers can easily remove browser-based cookies from
their computer’s hard drive by clearing their online browsing history or
deleting cookies through a browser tool.53 Unlike browser-based cookies,
Flash cookies are a more “persistent” form of behavioral tracking;
47

FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2.

48

See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“Cookies are widely used on the internet by reputable websites to promote convenience
and customization.”).
49

Richard M. Marsh, Jr., Note, Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New
Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 543, 546 (2009).
50

See id.

51

See Brown, supra note 41, at 232.

52

See Robert D. Forbes, Recent Lawsuits Challenge Use of Flash Cookies to Track
Online Behavior, PROSKAUER PRIVACY L.BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010, 10:36 AM),
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2010/09/articles/behavioral-marketing/recent-lawsuitschallenge-use-of-flash-cookies-to-track-online-behavior/.
53

See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 1-2 (Aug. 10, 2009) (Working
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862.

10
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uncontrolled by a browser, Flash cookies are more difficult for consumers
to delete if they wish to prevent companies from using them to collect
behavioral data.54 In fact, a recent study found:
[The] top 100 websites are using Flash cookies to
‘respawn,’ or recreate deleted HTTP cookies. This means
that privacy-sensitive consumers who “toss” their HTTP
cookies to prevent tracking or remain anonymous are still
being uniquely identified online by advertising companies.
[In addition, f]ew websites disclose their use of Flash in
privacy policies, and many companies using Flash are
privacy certified by TRUSTe.55
For these reasons, Flash cookies ignite greater concern among consumers
and privacy advocates, and have been at the heart of several class-action
lawsuits.56
[16] In addition, scholars also distinguish between “passive” and
“active” collection of consumer data.57 In the case of active data
collection, the consumer chooses to share his or her personal information
with the advertiser – typically in response to some kind of incentive.58 By
contrast, passive collection typically occurs when the advertiser places a
cookie on the consumer’s computer.59 Spyware and adware represent two
methods of passive data collection related to behavioral advertising.60
54

Id. at 1.

55

Id. at 2. TRUSTe is a for-profit entity that monitors privacy policies on various
websites to determine if they are adequate. See infra Part IV.B (discussing TRUSTe’s
business model and its compliance program for online behavioral advertisers).
56

See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Godoy v. Quantcast Corp., No. CV10-7662-RGK (JCG),
2010 WL 4236367 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2010) (“‘Flash cookies’ … are often used in place
of or as a back-up for browser cookies . . . [and] have been used to recreate the browser
cookie if it is deleted by the internet user.”); Complaint, La Court v. Specific Media, Inc.,
No. SACV10-01256, 2010 WL 3581775 (C.D. Cal. Aug.18, 2010).
57

Raysman & Brown, supra note 8.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

[17] Spyware is a form of software that, when installed on a consumer’s
computer, “collects and reports in-depth information about [an] enduser.”61 On the other hand, adware does not involve the installation of
software on a consumer’s hard drive.62 Instead, adware is software that
tracks a consumer’s online activity and causes pop-up advertisements to
appear on the consumer’s screen only after the consumer views a specific
website.63
[18] The foregoing methods of behavioral targeting are designed to help
advertisers provide the consumer with tailored advertisements.64 This
collection of data about Internet users is important to advertisers because it
increases the value of each ad impression and improves the “click-through
rate”65 – ultimately, increasing the advertisers’ overall revenue.66
60

See Daniel B. Garrie et al., Regulating Spyware: Challenges and Solutions, 13 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 3-4 (2010); Heather Osborn Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal
Regulators Must Treat Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 369, 373-75 (2009).
61

Garrie et al., supra note 60, at 3.

62

C.f. Denise A. Golumbaski, Comment, Spyware Phones Home: Should the FTC
Answer the Call for Regulation?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1171, 1178 (2005) (stating that
adware has several legitimate uses and poses less of a threat to consumers).
63

See id.

64

See Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, Chairman Leibowitz’s Disconnect on Privacy
Regulation & the Future of News, THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. (Jan. 2010),
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2010/ps6.1-Leibowitz-disconnect-on-privacy-andadvertising.html.
65

The “click-through rate” is a metric used to determine how many times a web user is
diverted from the site on which an advertisement is displayed to the advertiser’s website.
See Stacey L. Dogan, Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 467, 478 (2010). It is measured by dividing the total number of clicks an
ad receives by the number of times the ad is shown. See Peter T. Tschanz, A
Constitutional Right to Deceive?: The First Amendment Implications of Regulating Pay
per Click, 2010 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 92201, *7 n.56 (2010) (quoting Animesh
Animesh et al., Competing “Creatively” in Online Markets: Evidence from Sponsored
Search 6 (Univ. of Md. Robert H. Smith Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. RHS-06-064,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032199.
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[19] Frequently, however, consumers do not expressly consent to the
collection of their personal information.67 For example, in the context of
traditional behavioral advertising, including the placement of cookies on
consumers’ computers, website operators include provisions about these
practices in their privacy policies and terms of use.68 Operators typically
link to these documents from the initial landing page.69 However, it is
also widely believed that consumers do not read these policies, because
either they are uninterested or feel the documents are written in legalese
and, thus, are incomprehensible.70
[20] Nonetheless, even if consumers do not read online license
agreements, privacy policies, or terms of use, they could be bound by their
terms.71 For example, in the case of spyware, a consumer downloads
software onto his or her computer, but often can do so only after expressly
consenting to the software provider’s license agreement (typically referred
66

See Pamela Jones Harbor, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before FTC
Exploring Privacy Roundtable 2 (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/harbour/091207privacyroundtable.pdf.
67
See id.
68

See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 564-66 (describing Google’s privacy policy and its
presumption of consent regarding “cookie-based data collection”).
69

See generally Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They
Are Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 202 (2007).
70

See Thierer & Szoka, supra note 64, at 1 (stating the “‘literature is clear’ that few
people read [online] privacy policies”); see also Carr, supra note 29 (“Meanwhile, 45%
of teens said they do read [websites’] terms and conditions-- but does anyone actually
believe nearly half of all 15- to18-year-olds are scanning pages of online legalese?”).
71

See M. Angela Buenaventura, Teaching a Man to Fish: Why National Legislation
Anchored in Notice and Consent Provisions Is the Most Effective Solution to the Spyware
Problem, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14-15 (2006) (noting that courts often construe
clickwrap agreements as binding “whether or not meaningful consent was actually
present, and whether or not the user even saw the terms [of the contract] to begin with.”).
But cf. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 528 n.29 (2003)
(stating that unlike clickwrap agreements, browsewrap agreements involve no actual
consent; therefore, “no court to actually consider the enforceability of browsewrap
licenses under contract law has found them enforceable.”).
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to as a “clickwrap agreement”).72 One federal judge jokingly described
consumers’ assent to clickwrap agreements in the following way:
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny
for the latest and greatest software, speed back to your
computer . . . click on “install” and, after scrolling past a
license agreement which would take at least fifteen minutes
to read, find yourself staring at the following dialog box: “I
agree.” Do you click the box? You probably do not agree
in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway, not about to
let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve
been waiting. Is that “clickwrap” license agreement
enforceable? Yes . . . .73
Accordingly, although a consumer may never actually read the terms of a
clickwrap agreement before clicking “I Agree,” courts generally uphold
these agreements as enforceable contracts.74 However, companies have
had less success arguing that when they include a link to their privacy
policies and terms of use on their home page, those legal documents (i.e.,
browsewrap agreements) constitute enforceable contracts with consumers
who use their website.75 “Unlike a clickwrap agreement, a browsewrap
72

See infra Part III.A.2 (describing a clickwrap agreement Sears required consumers to
consent to before allowing them to download its software program).
73
I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass.
2002).
74

See id. at 338 (holding a clickwrap agreement to be an enforceable contract); Forrest v.
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (upholding a forum
selection clause contained in a clickwrap agreement).
75

See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
a browsewrap agreement unenforceable because there was insufficient notice of its
terms); Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating
that for a browsewrap agreement to be enforceable, “the website user must have had
actual or constructive knowledge of the site's terms and conditions, and have manifested
assent to them.”). But see Kimberley Rose Goldberg, Note, Platform for Privacy
Preferences (“P3P”): Finding Consumer Assent to Electronic Privacy Policies, 14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 255, 270-71 & n.89 (2003) (stating that
courts might enforce browsewrap agreements if consumers continue browsing a website
after they view that website’s home page).
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agreement ‘does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and
conditions expressly . . . [a] party instead gives his assent simply by using
the website.’”76
[21] Nonetheless, as Part III describes, the enforceability of an online
agreement may not necessarily prevent the FTC from bringing an
enforcement action against an online advertiser.77 In the past, to avoid
facing an FTC enforcement action, an online advertiser only needed to
disclose the extent to which it collected and used data about consumers’
online activities – provided that the company abided by the representations
in its online agreements.78 But, recently, the FTC brought an enforcement
action against Sears for data collection practices it did disclose in its
online privacy policy because the agency believed the privacy policy was
misleading and led consumers to believe that they would know the extent
to which Sears was tracking them online when, in fact, they did not.79

III. THE FTC’S ROLE: SELF-REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT
A. The FTC’s Authority to Attack Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices

76

Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007)), aff'd, 380 F. App'x. 22 (2d Cir. 2010).
77

See infra Part III.A.

78

J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Some Reflections on the Future of
the Internet: Net Neutrality, Online Behavioral Advertising, and Health Information
Technology at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Telecommunications & E-Commerce
Committee
Fall
Meeting
8
(Oct.
26,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/091026chamber.pdf (“I’m personally not sure I would
conclude that behavioral tracking that collects nonsensitive information is necessarily
deceptive or unfair within the meaning of Section 5 [of the FTC Act], even if a particular
consumer might find such practices disturbing or invasive.”).
79

See In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770 (F.T.C.), at
*1 (Aug. 31, 2009); infra Part III.A.2.
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[22] The FTC and more specifically, its Bureau of Consumer Protection
(“BCP”), acts as the primary enforcer for matters involving online
consumer privacy.80 In fact, the FTC recently established a new office,
the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, which aims to protect
online consumer privacy, ensure information security, and combat identity
theft.81 The FTC’s authority to attack improper conduct related to online
consumer privacy exists under Section 5 of the FTC Act.82 This statute
authorizes the FTC to protect consumers by prohibiting any “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” as well as “[u]nfair
methods of competition.”83 For the first thirty years after the enactment of
the FTC Act, the FTC failed to distinguish between “unfair” and
“deceptive” practices when bringing enforcement actions.84 However, in
1964, the FTC articulated a test for unfairness in its Cigarette Rule
Statement of Basis and Purpose and, thereby, created two distinct
categories of enforcement authority: unfairness authority and the authority
to attack deceptive practices.85
[23] Unlike its authority to attack deceptive practices, the FTC’s
unfairness authority is no longer widely utilized.86 In a 2003 speech,
former Director of the FTC’s BCP Howard Beales suggested that the
FTC’s resistance to using its unfairness authority stemmed from a period
80

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 72-73 (2004); Collins, supra note 13, at 571-73.
81

Division of Privacy & Identity Protection, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last updated Oct. 23, 2007).
82

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).

83

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); Howard J. Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its
Rise, Fall, and Resurrection (May 30, 2003), available at 2003 WL 21501809 (F.T.C.),
at *1.
84

Beales, supra note 83.

85

See id. (citing Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation
to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 28 Fed. Reg. 8355
(1964)).
86

See id. at *1, *4-5.
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in the 1970s during which the FTC executed a broad and overreaching
plan to ban all advertising aimed at children on grounds that it was
“immoral, unscrupulous, and unethical.”87 In response to this and similar
actions, members of the popular press began referring to the FTC as,
“[The] [N]ational [N]anny.”88
The FTC’s actions also garnered
disapproval from members of Congress.89 As a result, Congress enacted
legislation that prohibited the FTC from utilizing “unfairness” to restrict
advertising and did not reauthorize the FTC to use its unfairness authority
for enforcement actions until approximately fifteen years later.90 In
addition, when Congress eventually reauthorized the FTC’s unfairness
authority in 1994, it set forth a three-part test for unfairness that focused
on consumer injury.91
[24] Therefore, today, for the FTC to use its enforcement authority to
attack a trade practice based on unfairness, the injury to consumers must
be: “(1) substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits, and (3) one that
consumers cannot reasonably avoid.”92 To fulfill the first element, the
injury must be real and considerable, even when weighed against
offsetting benefits.93 Generally, substantial injury constitutes economic
harm or threats to public health and safety, but emotional distress typically

87

Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing how Former Chairman Michael
Pertschuk also stated in his remarks that the FTC’s unfairness authority was so broad that
the agency could utilize it to punish polluters and regulate the employment of illegal
aliens, among other things).
88

See, e.g., Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.

89

See Beales, supra note 83, at *2.

90

Id.; see Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94
Stat. 374.
91

See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108
Stat. 1691; Beales, supra note 83, at *5. Today, the unfairness test is codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
92

Beales, supra note 83, at *5; see 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).

93

Beales, supra note 83, at *6.
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does not satisfy the standard.94 The second part of the unfairness test
requires that any harm or injury to consumers be weighed against any
benefit consumers receive because of the allegedly unfair practice.95 For
example, in the context of online behavioral advertising, the collection of
consumer data is arguably not an “unfair trade practice” because
consumers receive access to free online content in exchange for data about
their online activity.96 Finally, “the reasonable avoidance prong limits
unfairness actions to those where the Commission seeks ‘to halt some
form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an
obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision-making.’”97 Although
the FTC does not currently utilize its unfairness authority often, it can be a
powerful tool to attack unfair business practices online, like Internet
scams.98

94

Id.

95

Id. This element is important in the context of online behavioral advertising because
consumers receive “free” content in exchange for the collection of their personal data.
See HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1.
96

See J. Thomas Rosch, supra note 78, at 13. In the Sears action, infra Part III.A.2,
Sears paid consumers $10.00 in exchange for permission to collect data about the
consumer’s online activity. Lesley Fair, Someone to Watch Over Me?, BCP BUS. CTR.,
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/someone-watch-over-me (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
Thus, the FTC brought its enforcement action against Sears under its authority to attack
deceptive practices, rather than its unfairness authority. See 15 U.S.C. § 45; In re Sears
Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770, at *4 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009).
But see Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract?
Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009).
97

Beales, supra note 83, at *6 (quoting Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford &
Hon. John Danforth, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., U.S. Senate, Comm’n
Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980),
reprinted in In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1984 WL 565290, at *95 (F.T.C.
Dec. 21, 1984)).
98

See Beales, supra note 83, at *7-13; FTC v. Zuccarini, No. CIV.A. 01-CV-4854, 2002
WL 1378421, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2002) (attacking online “mousetrapping,” i.e.,
programming websites to take control of consumer computers and forcing consumers to
view numerous pop-up advertisements).
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[25] The FTC’s authority to prohibit deceptive acts is much more
straightforward. In its 1983 Statement of Deception, the agency
articulated three elements that must be present for the FTC to bring an
enforcement action under its authority to attack deceptive practices.99 A
deceptive trade practice exists when: (1) there is a representation or
omission; (2) that is likely to mislead reasonable consumers; and (3) the
representation or omission is material.100
[26] Either express or implied claims may fulfill the first element, but
for implied claims the FTC examines extrinsic evidence and other facts
like the nature of the transaction and the location of the language within
the document.101 The FTC evaluates such statements from the perspective
of a “reasonable consumer,” and when a product targets a specific
audience, the FTC also investigates the effect on members of that
consumer group.102 Finally, “[a] ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice
is one which is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct
regarding a product. In other words, it is information that is important to
consumers.”103 The FTC presumes that express claims are material
because an advertiser would not logically include information in its
marketing if it did not want the claim to affect consumer perception about

99

See Letter from James C. Miller III to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in
In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 WL 565319, at *45 (F.T.C. Mar. 23
1984) [hereinafter FTC Statement on Deception].
100

Id.

101

See id. at *46; see also In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 1981 WL
389401, at *192 (F.T.C. Sept. 9, 1981) (evaluating the advertisements at issue “in their
entirety” to determine the existence of an implied claim), aff’d, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
1982); In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398, 1489-90 (1975) (examining an
implied claim through the location of language within a document), aff’d, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
102

See FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, at *46 n.20 (“An interpretation may
be reasonable even though it is not shared by a majority of consumers . . . or by
particularly sophisticated consumers.”).
103

Id. at *49.
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the relevant product or service.104 Moreover, most representations will
fulfill this element because the FTC also classifies information as material
if “it concerns the purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost of [a] product or
service” or “if it concerns durability, performance, warranties or
quality.”105
[27] Enforcement actions against providers of Internet products or
services have typically been brought under the FTC’s authority to attack
deceptive practices.106
To date, the FTC has brought only one
enforcement action specifically related to online behavioral advertising.107
Because of this, two recent actions involving deceptive practices online, In
re Gateway Learning Corp.108 and In re Sears Holdings Management
Corp.,109 are particularly relevant to the analysis of how the FTC might
attack the collection of data regarding consumers’ online activities going
forward.

104

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commission of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
567-68 (1980) (“In the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we
may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief
that consumers are interested in the advertising.”).
105

FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99, at *49 (footnotes omitted).

106

See Rosch, supra note 78, at 9.

107

In re Chitika, Inc., No. 102-3087, 2011 WL 914035, at *1-3 (F.T.C. March 14, 2011);
see also Ng, supra note 60, at 391; Rosch, supra note 78, at 12-13 (explaining that
presumably, it is difficult for the FTC to bring enforcement actions against online
behavioral advertisers because (1) the agency cannot bring an enforcement action for a
deceptive practice if advertisers fully disclose their data collection practices in online
privacy policies or a website’s terms of use; and (2) the FTC is unable to fulfill second
prong of the unfairness test because although the collection of data may “harm”
consumers, they receive an off-setting benefit because they receive free access to online
content, like newspapers and magazines).
108

In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 443-44, 467 (2004).

109

In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., No. 082-3099, 2009 WL 2979770, at *1, *5
(F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009).
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1. FTC Enforcement Action Against Gateway Learning Corporation
[28] Beginning in 2000, Gateway Learning Corporation, the provider of
“Hooked on Phonics” products, marketed its products online at the
following website: http://www.hop.com.110 The privacy policy on
Gateway’s website declared: “We do not sell, rent or loan any personally
identifiable information regarding our consumers with any third party
unless we receive customer’s explicit consent.”111 Moreover, the policy
stated that Gateway would notify consumers of any changes to their
privacy policy and, at that time, would offer consumers the opportunity to
“opt-out” of Gateway’s data collection practices.112 Nonetheless, in 2003,
Gateway began renting consumers’ personal information to third-party
advertisers for direct mailing and telemarketing purposes.113
Subsequently, the company altered its privacy policy “to say that ‘from
time to time’ Gateway Learning would provide consumers’ personal
information to ‘reputable companies’ whose products or services
consumers might find of interest . . . .”114
[29] Shortly thereafter, the FTC filed an enforcement action in which it
alleged that by failing to notify consumers about the retroactive
application of its altered privacy policy, Gateway engaged in both unfair
and deceptive trade practices.115 Because Gateway failed to notify its
existing customers about the change to their privacy policy, it prevented
consumers from deciding whether to allow Gateway to provide third-party
marketers with their personal information and, thus, engaged in an unfair

110

Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges
(Jul. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm.
111

Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).

112

Id.

113

See id.

114

Id.

115

See In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. at 449-50.
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practice in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act.116 Similarly, the FTC alleged
that Gateway also engaged in deceptive practices because Gateway
represented to consumers in its privacy policy that it would not sell or rent
customer data and, subsequently, rented the information to third-party
advertisers without obtaining the express consent of consumers.117
[30] The FTC entered a Consent Order (i.e., a settlement agreement
between the agency and the offending party) in Gateway on September 10,
2004.118
The agreement prohibited Gateway from making
misrepresentations about how it would use data collected about
consumers’ online activities.119 In addition, the Consent Order required
Gateway to obtain “express affirmative (‘opt-in’) consent from
consumers” when it made “material changes to its [online] privacy
polic[ies]” and prohibited Gateway from making retroactive changes to its
data collection practices.120
2. FTC Enforcement Action Against Sears Holdings
Management Corporation
[31] More recently, in 2009, the FTC filed an action against Sears under
§ 5 of the FTC Act for deceptive practices related to its “My SHC
Community” program.121 The FTC alleged that Sears failed to notify
customers that when they installed Sears’ software tracking application,
the software collected information about all of the consumers’ online and
even offline activities (including web browsing histories, purchases, email messages, and even secure data like online checking account
information), and transmitted the customers’ data to Sears.122 According
116

See id. at 449.

117

See id. at 449-50.

118

Id. at 443.

119

See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 110.

120

Id.

121

See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *1; Gindin, supra note 96, at 1.

122

See Gindin, supra note 96, at 1.
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to the FTC, Sears invited customers to their websites –
http://www.sears.com and http://www.kmart.com – and asked them to
participate in the “My SHC Community” program.123 Sears offered to pay
customers $10.00 and, in exchange, customers would download the “My
SHC Community” software to their computers, which would track their
“online browsing.”124 In its marketing e-mails, Sears stated:
My SHC Community is a dynamic and highly interactive
online community. It’s a place where your voice is heard
and your opinion matters, and what you want and need
counts! As a member of My SHC Community, you’ll
partner directly with the retail industry. You’ll participate
in exciting, engaging and on-going interactions – always on
your terms and always by your choice.125
Sears’s marketing e-mails reiterated that although participants downloaded
software that would “confidentially track [customers’] online browsing,”
the collection would always be “on [their own] terms and always by [their]
choice.”126 Once consumers elected to participate in the program, Sears
directed them to a landing page that displayed the same content included
in its marketing e-mails.127 Finally, consumers completed a registration
form that presented a Privacy Statement and User License Agreement
(“PSULA”).128 Consumers were required to click on a box, stating that
they had read and agreed to the terms of the PSULA, to complete their
registration.129 Sears included additional details in the PSULA about the

123

Fair, supra note 95.

124

Id.

125

In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *2 (emphasis added).

126

Id.

127

See id. at *3.

128

Id. at *3-4.

129

Id. at *4.
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extent to which they would track consumers’ activities.130 Even though
Sears required consumers to agree to the terms of the PSULA before
downloading the “My SHC Community” software, the FTC argued that
the marketing e-mails (and information on various landing pages) made
material misrepresentations to consumers and, thus, constituted a
deceptive practice.131 In essence, the FTC alleged that Sears could not
reasonably expect consumers to read the PSULA and, therefore, should
have provided “clear and prominent” notice to consumers about the
information they planned to collect on the landing pages consumers
viewed prior to downloading the software.132
[32] Eventually, Sears settled with the FTC, agreeing to destroy the data
collected and clearly identifying any future attempts to track consumers’
online activities.133 The current Director of the FTC’s BCP, David
Vladeck, described Sears as “‘an absolutely classic deception case’” that
“hinged on full disclosure and notice.”134 In his view, “Sears enticed
people into participating in this program by offering a few dollars but not
really telling them what they were doing with the data.”135 In so doing,

130

See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *3-4; see also Exhibit D, In re Sears Holding
Mgmt. Corp., 2009 WL 2979770 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009) (No. C-4264).
131

See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *4.

132

See id. at *6-7. The FTC’s action did not challenge the enforceability of the PSULA –
instead it argued that Sears placed deceptive language in its marketing e-mails and
websites (i.e., Sears implied that consumers would retain control over the collection of
their information when, in fact, the “My SHC Community” software ran in the
background of their computers, and consumers who installed the application often had no
knowledge that their personal information was collected). See id. at *4; Gindin, supra
note 96, at 2.
133

See In re Sears, 2009 WL 2979770, at *6-7; Edmund Lee, FTC’s Top Consumer Cop
Likes Personalization of Web, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 27, 2010,
http://adage.com/article?article_id=146064.
134

Lee, supra note 133.

135

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Sears belittled consumers and demonstrated a genuine lack of concern for
online consumer privacy.136
B. FTC Guidelines for Self-Regulation in Online Behavioral Advertising
[33] After almost a decade of exploring the impact of Internet
advertising on online consumer privacy through discussions with privacy
advocates, members of the online advertising industry, and legislators, the
FTC released its Guidelines for Self-Regulation in Online Behavioral
Advertising (“FTC Guidelines”) in February 2009.137 Although the FTC
recognized that individuals had legitimate concerns about the collection
and storage of data related to their online activities, the agency also stated
that consumers received a real benefit from this practice, in the form of
free access to online content.138 In addition, the agency noted that many
consumers valued the tailored advertising they received because of
behavioral tracking.139 For example, Director Vladeck admitted that he
“sort of like[s] the personalization” of advertisements he receives on the
Internet.140 Therefore, by implementing a voluntary program of selfregulation, the FTC sought to “address practices that raise genuine privacy
concerns without interfering with practices – or stifling innovation –
where privacy concerns are minimal.”141 In addition, the FTC Guidelines
“appl[ied] broadly to companies engaged in online behavioral advertising,
defined as tracking consumers’ online activities in order to deliver
advertising that is targeted to the individual consumers’ interests.”142

136

See id.

137

See generally FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8.

138

Id. at 1.

139

Id.

140

Lee, supra note 133 (internal quotations marks omitted).

141

FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 1.

142

Id. at 20.
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[34] Four major concepts govern the FTC Guidelines: (1) control and
transparency; (2) security and limited data retention; (3) affirmative
express consent for material changes to existing privacy promises; and (4)
affirmative express consent to (or prohibition against) use sensitive data
for behavioral advertising.143 The first principle instructs companies that
collect data regarding consumers’ online activity to “provide meaningful
disclosures to consumers” about the information collected and an ability to
opt-out of the practice.144 The second principle encourages companies
that employ behavioral advertising to “provide reasonable data security
measures” that will prevent inadvertent disclosure of sensitive data and to
keep such data on file only as long as necessary to achieve their business
objectives.145 The third principle directs companies to obtain consumers’
express consent when they make material changes to their privacy policies
concerning the data collected.146 Finally, the fourth principle requires
companies to “obtain [consumers’] affirmative express consent before
they use sensitive data – for example, data about children, health, or
finances – for behavioral advertising.”147
[35] Although the FTC Guidelines provided broad principles to move
the industry toward an environment more protective of online consumer
privacy, the agency recognized that this was just a “step in an ongoing
process.”148 Moreover, the FTC urged the industry to take ownership of
the self-regulatory model by requiring that all industry members comply
143

Id. at 11-12.

144

Id. at 11. The FTC described “meaningful disclosure” in the following way:
“[W]ebsites where data is collected for behavioral advertising should provide [1]
prominent notice to consumers about such practices and [2] should also offer consumers
the ability to choose whether to allow such collection and use.” Id. at 30.
145

Id. at 11. The report does not specifically define “reasonable data security measures,”
however, it does note that these measures could include (1) ensuring anonymity of all the
data collected; or (2) requiring companies to destroy data after a certain length of time,
like six months. See id. at 37-38.
146

FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 11-12.

147

Id. at 12.

148

Id. at 47.
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with the FTC Guidelines and work to solve the privacy problems
behavioral advertising presents.149 As a result, in July 2009, several trade
associations150 representing various parts of the advertising industry
developed a similar set of self-regulatory guidelines (“Industry
Guidelines”).151
[36] Like the FTC Guidelines, the Industry Guidelines set forth seven
core principles: (1) transparency; (2) consumer control; (3) data security;
(4) notification of material changes in privacy practices; (5) enhanced
protection of sensitive data; (6) consumer education; and (7)
accountability.152 In fact, five of the seven principles, the Transparency
and Consumer Control Principles, the Data Security Principle, the
Material Changes Principle, and the Sensitive Data Principle,
corresponded directly to the governing principles in the FTC
Guidelines.153 In addition, the Industry Guidelines’ two other principles,
the Education and Accountability Principles corresponded to important
additional commentary in the FTC Guidelines.154 For example, the
Education Principle directed companies to educate consumers about the

149

See id. at 47-48.

150

The trade associations that developed the online advertising industry’s self-regulatory
guidelines were the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Association of
National Advertisers, the Council of Better Business Bureaus, the Direct Marketing
Association, and the Interactive Advertising Bureau. See Interactive Advertising Bureau
et al., Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising, ABOUTADS.INFO
(July
2009),
http://aboutads.info/resource/download/seven-principles-07-01-09.pdf
[hereinafter Industry Guidelines].
151

See id. at 1.

152

Id. at 2-4.

153

Id. at 1.

154

See id. at 1-4; see also Hunton & Williams LLP, Live Coverage from Jerusalem:
Vladeck Provides Overview of Upcoming FTC Report, PRIVACY & INFORMATION
SECURITY LAW BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/
2010/10/articles/events/live-coverage-from-jerusalem-vladeck-provides-overview-ofupcoming-ftc-report/#more [hereinafter Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem].
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benefits and concerns associated with online behavioral advertising.155
Similarly, the Accountability Principle encouraged members of the
industry to “develop and implement policies and programs to further
adherence to [the Industry Guidelines],” and stated that these programs
should “have mechanisms by which they [could] police entities engaged in
online behavioral advertising and help bring [non-compliant] entities into
compliance.”156
[37] Despite the FTC’s efforts to adopt a regulatory model that would
be flexible in response to innovation, some argued that the FTC did not go
far enough.157 For example, FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch argued
that the best way to protect online consumer privacy was for the United
States to adopt a regulatory framework like the European Union’s
overarching approach to privacy instead of the existing sectoral approach
to privacy legislation.158
[38] Nonetheless, FTC Commissioner (now Chairman) Jon Leibowitz
issued a Concurring Statement to the FTC Guidelines, which stated that
the agency’s endorsement of self-regulation was not a “regulatory

155

See Industry Guidelines, supra note 149, at 2.

156

Id. at 4.

157

See, e.g., HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1 (stating the FTC Guidelines
“while commendable, focus[] too narrowly” and she would prefer a “more
comprehensive approach to privacy.”).
158

See Rosch, supra note 78, at 8 (acknowledging that Europeans view the American
approach to online behavioral advertising as “a cavalier attitude toward . . . ‘spying’”).
The European Union, unlike the United States, has data privacy rules that apply broadly
across all industries. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE,
COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC
POLICY FRAMEWORK 11-12 (2010) [hereinafter COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov//reports/2010/IPTF_Privacy_
GreenPaper_12162010.pdf. By contrast, the United States “protects personal data
through a sectoral framework . . . . that uses voluntary enforceable codes of conduct . . .
together with strong sectoral privacy laws covering certain information categories such as
health, finance, education, and information about children.” Id. at 11-12 (citations
omitted).
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retreat.”159 Instead, he stated that the industry should view the guidelines
as its “last clear chance to show that self-regulation can – and will –
effectively protect consumers’ privacy in a dynamic online
marketplace.”160 Therefore, the FTC hoped that the threat of regulation –
should voluntary self-regulation not be successful in ensuring greater
protection of online consumer privacy – would “scare” companies into
taking self-regulation seriously.161
C. New Frameworks for Online Consumer Privacy:
Recent FTC and Department of Commerce Reports
1. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change:
A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers
(Preliminary FTC Staff Report)
[39] Approximately two years after the release of its guidelines for
self-regulation in online behavioral advertising, the FTC published a
preliminary staff report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid
Change (the “Report”), which broadly addresses consumer privacy both
on and offline.162 Based on a series of roundtable discussions the agency
held with members of the industry and Congress, the Report encourages
companies to provide real-time notification of behavioral tracking and
includes recommendations for providing “clear and meaningful ways for

159

FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING – CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JON
LEIBOWITZ 1 (2009) [hereinafter LEIBOWITZ CONCURRENCE], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadleibowitz.pdf.
160

Id.

161

See id.

162

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS i (2010)
[hereinafter FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
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consumer to have more control and choice over information collected
about them online.”163
[40] At the 2010 International Conference of Data Protection and
Privacy Commissioners, Director Vladeck spoke about the Report and
emphasized that it highlights the need for consumer education so that
consumers are fully aware of what behavioral advertising is, when it is
happening, and how they can control their information.164 In addition, the
Report concludes that neither of the existing privacy models – the “noticeand-choice” and the “harm-based” models – have kept up with the rapidly
evolving technologies that businesses use to collect and manipulate
consumer data.165
[41] First, the notice-and-choice model sought to “encourage[]
companies to develop privacy notices describing their [data] collection
and use practices to consumers, so that consumers [could] make informed
choices . . . .”166 However, this approach became problematic because,
over time, privacy notices grew more complex and difficult for consumers
to understand.167 In addition, very few companies gave consumers any
opportunity to the control the collection and use of their personal
information.168 As a result, the notice-and-choice model “place[d] too

163

Juliana Gruenwald, FTC Privacy Report May be Released by Late October,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://techdailydose.national
journal.com/2010/09/ftc-privacy-report-may-be-rele.php (internal quotation marks
omitted); see FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at ii.
164

See Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.

165

See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at iii (“[T]he notice-andchoice model . . . has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers
typically do not read,” while the harm-based model fails to compensate privacy-related
injuries, like damage to one’s reputation or “fear of being monitored.”).
166

Id.

167

See id. at 19.

168

Id.
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much burden on consumers to read and understand privacy notices and
make privacy choices.”169
[42] Second, the harm-based model aimed to “protect[] consumers from
specific harms” like “physical security, economic injury, and unwanted
intrusions into their daily lives.”170 However, this model is often maligned
for its failure to take into account reputational injury and other
privacy-related harms.171 Therefore, because “[c]onsumers may feel
harmed when their personal information . . . is collected, used, or shared
without their knowledge or consent or in a manner that is contrary to their
expectations,”172 the FTC recognized that “there is a pressing need to
reexamine the conception of ‘harm’ in U.S. law . . . .”173
[43] Based on those conclusions, the Report proposes a new framework
centered on three key principles.174 The first principle, Privacy by Design,
contends that online advertisers and all businesses that collect consumer
data should do more to protect consumer privacy “on the front end,” by
incorporating additional privacy protections into their day-to-day business
operations.175 The second principle, Simplified Choice, states that
companies should ensure that their data collection and retention practices
align with consumers’ expectations, while offering consumers a real, clear
169

Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.

170

FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at iii.

171

Id.

172

Id. at 20 (citing Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 881 (2003)).
173

Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.

174

See generally FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162.

175

Id. at 41, 44-52; Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.
Privacy by Design is an approach adopted by the Information and Privacy Commissioner
of Ontario, Ann Cavoukian, Ph.D., which promotes that organizations adopt a proactive
role in developing privacy protections. See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra
note 162, at v n.3 (citing PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://www.privacybydesign.ca (last
visited Jan. 6, 2011)).

31

Richmond Journal of Law and Technology

Vol. XVII, Issue 4

choice to opt-out, at the exact time they plan to collect consumers’
personal information.176 However, the FTC stated that companies need
not provide consumers an opportunity to opt-out of data collection for
“commonly accepted practices.”177 Commonly accepted data collection
practices include the fulfillment of product orders, “internal operations”
(i.e., customer service surveys), “fraud prevention,” compliance with law
enforcement, and, most controversially, “first-party marketing.”178
[44] The third principle, Greater Transparency, concludes that
“[c]ompanies should increase the transparency of their data practices.”179
Specifically, businesses should strive to provide consumers with short,
clear, and easily understandable privacy notices.180 In addition, the Report
also states that companies should give consumers the ability to access
information collected about them, so they can correct or modify inaccurate
data.181 Although the Report encourages companies to simplify their
privacy policies dramatically, it acknowledges the challenges companies
might face in implementing this principle, particularly in the “mobile

176

See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 41; Hunton & Williams
LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.
177

FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note162, at 41, 52-69.

178

Id. at 53-54; see supra Part II.B (describing the difference between first-party
marketing and cookie-based behavioral advertising). First-party marketing can be
controversial because companies might share consumer data with their affiliates, when
consumers are unaware of the extent of a company’s network of affiliates; however, the
FTC explicitly stated that “[i]f a company shares data with a third party other than a
service provider acting on the company’s behalf – including a business affiliate unless the
affiliate relationship is clear to consumers through common branding or similar means –
the company’s practices would not be considered first-party marketing.” FTC PROPOSED
PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 55.
179

Id. at 41; Hunton & Williams LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.

180

FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 41-42; Hunton & Williams
LLP, Live from Jerusalem, supra note 154.
181

See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at 74-75.
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context where, because of the small size of the device, a privacy notice
can be spread out over 100 separate screens.”182
[45] Finally, the Report also advocates for the creation of a
Do-Not-Track list, akin to the Do-Not-Call registry, which established a
limit on telemarketing calls made to residences.183 Nonetheless, the FTC
can only recommend, rather than mandate, a Do-Not-Track list unless
Congress provides the agency with additional rule-making authority.184
Privacy advocates and members of the advertising industry also debate
whether it would even be technologically feasible to establish such a
mechanism.185 However, immediately following the FTC’s release of the
Report, Microsoft announced that Internet Explorer 9, which it plans to
release shortly, incorporates “Tracking Protection,” a feature allowing
“consumers to determine the types of third-parties that can track their
[w]eb behavior.”186
182

Id. at 70-71.

183

See id. at 66; see also HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12 at 5 n.11 (discussing
the interest of privacy advocates in creating a Do-Not-Track List); Edward Wyatt &
Tanzina Vega, Stage Set for Showdown on Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/business/media/10privacy.html; Wendy Davis, FTC
Considers Do-Not-Track List, ONLINE MEDIA DAILY (July 27, 2010, 6:21 PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=132700.
184

Davis, Do-Not-Track System Lacks Mandate, supra note 12 (“[T]hough the FTC is
considering recommending such a system, the agency lacks the authority to mandate donot-track. Yes, the FTC can certainly say it thinks Web companies should figure out a
way to implement a universal do-not-track program, but can’t do much more absent
legislation.” (emphasis added)); see also FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra
note 162, at 66 (acknowledging that a Do-Not-Track List could be instituted by
self-regulation, but would likely require legislation).
185

See Sara Jerome, Public Interest Groups, Advertisers at Odds over Feasibility of ‘Do
Not Track’ List, HILLICON VALLEY: THE HILL’S TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2010, 2:07
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/125235-sides-disagree-ontechnological-ease-of-do-not-track (stating that consumer advocates “say the obstacles to
the [Do-Not-Track] system are policy-related and not technological,” but digital
advertisers claim the system would be difficult to implement because online tracking
methods are constantly evolving).
186

Juan Martinez, Microsoft Says Internet Explorer 9 Will Include Behavioral
Advertising
Opt-Out,
DIRECT
MARKETING
NEWS
(Dec.
8,
2010),
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[46] Notably, in the Report, the FTC did not ask Congress for
additional rule-making authority and did not endorse any of the privacy
bills introduced by legislators.187 Instead, the FTC appeared to recognize
that privacy legislation is still premature – asking stakeholders to respond
to more than fifty questions for comment.188 This lack of clarity suggests
that the FTC believes legislators should wait for more information before
they move forward with privacy legislation.
2. Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the
Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework
(Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force)
[47] The FTC is not the only administrative agency that recently
published a report regarding the collection of consumer data online.189 In
December 2010, the Department of Commerce, at the direction of the
Obama Administration, released a green paper on commercial data
privacy.190 Prior to its release, the Department of Commerce Assistant
Secretary Lawrence Strickland stated that the green paper was not “a final
position statement, but rather the beginning of a ‘dialogue’ that would lead
to an official administration policy on information privacy.”191
Nonetheless, the Department’s green paper aims to provide the
administration with suggestions for establishing a new framework for
Internet privacy, including recommendations for potential legislation.192
http://www.dmnews.com/microsoft-says-internet-explorer-9-will-include-behavioraladvertising-opt-out/article/ 192420/; see Tanzina Vega, Microsoft, Spurred by Privacy
Concerns, Introduces Tracking Protection to its Browser, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 12/08/business/media/08soft.html;
187

Cf. FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at vii-viii.

188

See FTC PROPOSED PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 162, at app. A.

189

See Wyatt & Vega, supra note 183.

190

See generally COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK supra note 158.

191

Julia Angwin, Watchdog Planned for Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703848204575608970171176014.html.
192

See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at i.
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A newly established task force headed by Cameron Kerry will endeavor to
turn the recommendations into federal policy.193
[48] Specifically, the green paper recommends the establishment of “a
baseline privacy framework” through legislation that will “afford
protection for consumers, and . . . clarify the U.S. approach to privacy to
[the United States’] trading partners – all without compromising the
current framework’s ability to accommodate new technologies.”194
Currently, the privacy statutes in the United States reflect a sectoral
approach to consumer privacy, which represents a legislative effort to
tailor privacy protections to the individual industries being regulated.195
However, according to the Department, this flexible approach has created
“gaps” in privacy law, into which “[m]uch of the personal data traversing
the Internet falls . . . .”196 Thus, the green paper recommends updating the
Fair Information Practice Principles197 so that privacy protections would
extend to data not currently covered under existing statutory
frameworks.198 In addition, the green paper also proposes that once these
baseline protections exist, it might not be necessary to enact additional

193

Angwin, supra note 190; Lance Whitney, White House Wants to Beef up Internet
Privacy Laws, CNET (Nov. 12, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_320022650-83.html.
194

COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 2-3; see also Christopher
Wolf, Summary of Draft Department of Commerce Privacy Green Paper, HOGAN
LOVELLS
CHRONICLE
OF
DATA
PROTECTION
(Nov.
15,
2010),
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/11/articles/general/summary-of-draft-departmentof-commerce-privacy-green-paper/ [hereinafter Wolf, Summary of Privacy Green Paper].
195

See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 11-12 (citing the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No.
104-191, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6809, 6821,
6827, as examples of sector-specific privacy bills).
196

Id. at 12.

197

See infra note 226 and accompanying text.

198

See COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 22.
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legislation tailored to specific industries.199
Rather, the FTC could
enforce voluntary industry codes of conduct through its existing authority
under § 5 of the FTC Act.200
[49] Like the FTC’s recent report, the Commerce Department’s report
does not endorse any of the existing privacy legislation.201 Moreover, the
Department’s green paper recognizes that, “[i]n many areas, the current
combination of sectoral laws and general FTC Section 5 enforcement
works well to protect the privacy of individuals.”202 And, although the
report recommends the creation a new federal office, the Privacy Policy
Office, to develop and implement new federal policies concerning
commercial data privacy, it states that the FTC should remain the primary
enforcer in matters concerning online consumer privacy.203 However, in
those areas where the current system is not as effective, the green paper
states that a new, dynamic approach is necessary to ensure that stronger
privacy protections are achieved, but not at the expense of online
innovation.204

199

See id. at 41-44 ( “Voluntary, enforceable codes of conduct should address emerging
technologies and issues not covered by [the] current application of baseline [Fair
Information Practice Principles.]”).
200

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158,
at 41-44.
201

COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 20-21.

202

Id. at 68.

203

See id. at 44-52.

204

See id. at 46.
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IV. THE NEXT STEP IN CONSUMER PRIVACY: THE INTRODUCTION OF
PRIVACY LEGISLATION AND INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO PREVENT IT
A. Recently-Introduced Privacy Legislation: BEST PRACTICES
Act and Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft
[50] Within the last year, several members of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce introduced online privacy legislation.205 In May
2010, Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns released the first of
these bills, a discussion draft of privacy legislation that aimed to regulate
the collection and use of consumer information by online behavioral
advertisers and other media providers.206 Approximately two months
later, Representative Bobby Rush introduced the BEST PRACTICES Act,
which has a similar purpose.207 Several Senators, notably Mark Pryor,
John Kerry, and John McCain, are working on online privacy
legislation.208 Senator Pryor’s legislation would mandate the creation of a
Do-Not-Track list that would allow consumers to permanently “opt-out of
having their [w]eb activities tracked for advertising purposes,”209 while the
205

See Hearing on H.R. 5777, supra note 14, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce).
206

See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___, 111th Cong. (as published by H. Subcomm.
on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), available at
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf; see also
Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15.
207

See BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, July 19, 2010) supra note 17.
208

See Press Release, Senator John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id= 59a56001-54304b6d-b476-460040de027b; Juliana Gruenwald, Measure Would Give Consumers More
Control over Web Tracking, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Sept. 30, 2010, 2:43 PM),
http://techdailydose.national journal.com/2010/09/measure-would-give-consumers-m.php
[hereinafter Gruenwald, Control Over Web Tracking]; Hunton & Williams LLP, Senator
Kerry's Senior Advisor Provides Key Insight into Forthcoming Privacy Bill, PRIVACY &
INFORMATION
SECURITY
LAW
BLOG
(Dec.
10,
2010),
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2010/12/articles/centre-for-information-policy2/senator-kerrys-senior-advisor-provides-key-insight-into-forthcoming-privacy-bill/
[hereinafter Hunton & Williams LLP, Senior Advisor].
209

Gruenwald, Control Over Web Tracking, supra note 208.
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privacy bill introduced by Senators Kerry and McCain seeks to establish
the baseline privacy framework advocated by the Commerce Department’s
recent green paper.210 Nonetheless, Congress’s purpose in enacting any
form of online privacy legislation would likely be to “make people more
likely to trust electronic commerce and the [I]nternet,” without stifling
innovation in the online advertising industry.211
[51] The Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft includes several
key provisions conferring additional responsibilities on online advertising
and additional privacy rights on individuals.212 For example, the Draft
would require companies that collect personally identifiable information
about consumers to display a “clear and conspicuous,” and easily
understandable privacy policy that describes how companies collect, use,
and disclose consumer data.213 Among other things, the Draft also
provides that “an individual has a reasonable expectation that a company
will not share that person’s information with unrelated third parties,” and
requires companies to obtain express consent before sharing that
information with third-party advertisers.214 Finally, the Draft grants the
210

Press Release, Senator John Kerry, supra note 209; Hunton & Williams LLP, Senior
Advisor, supra note 208; see also supra Part III.C (discussing the Commerce
Department’s December 2010 privacy report).
211

Avi Goldfarb & Catherine E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising 32
(Aug. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (quoting Cecilia Kang, New Bill on the Way for
Online
Privacy,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
8,
2009,
10:10
AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/09/new_bill_on_way_for_online_pri.htm),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600259.
212

See Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15.

213

See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ §§ 2(5), 3(a) 111th Cong. (as published by H.
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft),
available
at
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__
draft.pdf (describing the personally identifiable information included in the definition of
“covered information”). The bill refers to personally identifiable information, like
names, physical addresses, social security numbers as “covered information;” however,
notably, the definition also includes other data ordinarily referred to as non-personally
identifiable information, such as IP addresses and user preferences. Id.
214

Press Release, Cong. Rep. Cliff Stearns, supra note 15.
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FTC additional rule-making authority and states that a violation of the
bill’s provisions is an unfair and deceptive act under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.215 Nonetheless, although the Draft extends the FTC’s enforcement
authority, it explicitly precludes a private right of action.216
[52] However, in the 2010 mid-term elections, Congressman Rick
Boucher lost his congressional seat.217 When Republicans took over the
majority in the House of Representatives, many members of the industry
hoped that takeover would spell the end of potential legislation regarding
online consumer privacy and behavioral advertising.218 Yet, Republican
legislators have made clear that privacy is a bipartisan issue.219 In fact,

215

Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 8(a)(1)-(3), 111th Cong. (as published by H.
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft),
available
at
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__
draft.pdf.
216

Id. § 9.

217

See Hunton & Williams LLP, Key Voice on Privacy Issues Loses Congressional
Reelection Bid While Another Joins the Senate, PRIVACY & INFORMATION SECURITY LAW
BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2010/11/articles/onlineprivacy/key-voice-on-privacy-issues-loses-congressional-reelection-bid-while-anotherjoins-the-senate/; Mike Shields, Online Privacy Bill: Dead in the Water?, ADWEEK
(Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/aw/content_display/news/politics/e3if13877
e698a1cce2faa1baf6cc66750a; Christopher Wolf, What the US Election Results Mean for
Privacy,
HL
CHRONICLE
OF
DATA
PROTECTION
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2010/11/articles/general/what-the-us-election-resultsmean-for-privacy/ [hereinafter Wolf, US Election Results].
218

See Shields, supra note 217 (“The Interactive Advertising Bureau, which has spent the
past two years rallying the online ad industry to take the regulation threat seriously, isn’t
hiding its pleasure at [the 2010 election] results.”).
219

See Press Release, Senator John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id= 59a56001-54304b6d-b476-460040de027b; see also Sara Jerome, Analysts: Privacy Bills Will Survive the
Election Storm, HILLICON VALLEY: THE HILL’S TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010, 1:45
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/126829-online-privacy-toremain-an-issue-for-gop-or-dem-led-house (noting that Congressman Cliff Stearns has
demonstrated a “‘serious concern about ensuring American consumers are fairly treated
when they go online.’” (quoting Jeff Chester, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Digital Democracy));
Shields, supra note 217 (“Privacy appeals to both lefty progressives and Tea Partiers.”
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Republican Congressman Joe Barton stated shortly after the 2010
elections that he would be “‘very, very willing to legislate in [the privacy]
area.’”220 Additionally, House Democrats remain equally committed to
moving forward on privacy legislation.221 Representative Bobby Rush,
author of the BEST PRACTICES Act, sought to oversee the House
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet.222 This
displays his commitment to pursuing online privacy legislation actively
and, perhaps, additional efforts he will take to garner support for the BEST
PRACTICES ACT.223
[53] Unlike the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft, the BEST
PRACTICES Act received outspoken support from the members of the
online media industry.224 Recently, Intel, eBay and Microsoft voiced their
support for the BEST PRACTICES Act, stating:
(statement of Jeff Chester, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Digital Democracy)); Wolf, US Election
Results, supra note 217.
220

The Communicators: Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX) (C-SPAN television broadcast Nov. 6,
2010), available at http://www.cspan.org/Events/Rep-Joe-Barton-R-TX/19686-1/; Barton
“Very, Very Willing to Legislate,” IAPP DAILY DASHBOARD (Nov. 8, 2010),
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2010_11_08_barton_very_very_willing
_to_legislate/.
221

Cecilia Kang, House to Hold Do Not Track Hearing on Internet Privacy, POST TECH
(Nov. 15, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/11/
the_house_subcommittee_for_com.html.
222

See Tony Romm, Rush Wants to Lead Tech Panel Dems, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2010,
4:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45053.html.
223

See id.

224

See Juliana Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms Back Rush's Privacy Bill, TECH
DAILY DOSE (Oct. 7, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/10/
thee-major-tech-firms-back-rus.php [hereinafter Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms];
Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 1-12 (2010),
http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/Privacy bills comparison chart_CDT_0.pdf (supplementing
Leslie Harris’ testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection on “The BEST
PRACTICES Act of 2010 and Other Federal Privacy Legislation”). Contra Tony Romm,
supra note 222 (describing the ensuing debate between both critics and supporters over
legislation addressing the collection of consumer information on the web).
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We support the bill’s overall framework, which is built
upon the Fair Information Practices regime. We appreciate
that the BEST PRACTICES Act is technology neutral and
gives flexibility to the Federal Trade Commission to adapt
to changes in technology . . . . The bill also strikes the
appropriate balance by providing businesses with the
opportunity to enter into a robust self-regulatory
program.225
Despite their general support for the BEST PRACTICES Act, the
companies voiced concerns about the bill’s private right of action, which
would likely cause “unnecessary litigation costs and uncertainty for
businesses.”226 Therefore, they urged Representative Rush to remove that
provision from his bill.227
[54] In general, the BEST PRACTICES Act is more inclusive than the
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft.228 For example, the Draft
225

Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms, supra note 224; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N,
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm. The Fair Information Practices are “the rights and
responsibilities associated with the transfer and use of personal information.” DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 657 (3d ed. 2009). They
include the following: (1) Collection limitation (“There must be no personal data record
keeping systems whose very existence is secret.”); (2) Disclosure (“There must be a way
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it is
used.”); (3) Secondary usage (“There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.”); (4) Record correction (“There must
be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about
him.”); and (5) Security (“Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data
for their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”). Id. at
655-57 (citing DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 29-30, 41-42 (1973)).
226

Gruenweld, Three Major Tech Firms, supra note 225 (citation omitted) (internal
quotations marks omitted).
227

Id.

228

See generally Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 224.
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applies only to companies that collect sensitive data directly from
consumers, exempting businesses that utilize data collected by other
companies.229 By contrast, the BEST PRACTICES Act applies not only
to companies that collect consumer data online, but also to companies that
handle the information, like data brokers.230 Additionally, the BEST
PRACTICES Act contains a broader definition of “sensitive information,”
and specifically includes all types of “geolocation information,” 231 which
has been at the heart of many recent legal disputes.232
[55] Another notable difference between the two bills is that the
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft lacks a provision requiring
online behavioral advertisers to conduct internal audits and develop other
accountability mechanisms.233 By contrast, the BEST PRACTICES Act
229

See Boucher-Stearns Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(4), 111th Cong. (as published by H.
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft),
available
at
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__
draft.pdf.
230

See The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777 § 2(3), 111th Cong. (as reported by H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010); see also Privacy Bills Comparison
Chart, supra note 225, at 1.
231

See Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 225, at 2. Compare Boucher-Stearns
Privacy, H.R. ___ § 2(10), 111th Cong. (as published by H. Subcomm. on Commc’ns,
Tech., & the Internet, May 4, 2010) (Staff Discussion Draft), available at
http://stearns.house.gov/UploadedFiles/privacy_staff__discussion__draft.pdf
(defining
sensitive information as one’s medical records, race or ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexual
orientation, financial records, and precise location), with The BEST PRACTICES Act,
H.R. 5777 § 2(8), 111th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, July
19, 2010) (defining sensitive information as including any information about one’s
medical history, physical or mental health, or the provision of health care, race or
ethnicity, religious beliefs or affiliation, sexual orientation or sexual behavior, income,
financial records, or financial status, information about an individual’s location or
activities and relationships association with an individual’s location, biometric data like
fingerprints or retina scans, and social security numbers).
232

See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-66 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(discussing whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
geolocation data of their whereabouts, like GPS coordinates).
233

See Privacy Bills Comparison Chart, supra note 224, at 9.
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includes several accountability provisions.234 First, entities covered by the
BEST PRACTICES Act must “provide a process for individuals to make
complaints concerning the covered entity’s policies and procedures . . .
.”235 In addition, covered entities must also conduct privacy assessments
“prior to the implementation of commercial projects, marketing initiatives,
business models, applications, and other products and services” if the
entity concludes that the practice will result in the collection of data from
more than one million consumers.236
[56] The accountability provisions in the BEST PRACTICES Act are of
particular importance because they dovetail with the industry’s efforts to
increase accountability in online behavioral advertising through new
compliance programs.237 Furthermore, since it appears that neither the
Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft nor the BEST PRACTICES
Act will receive additional consideration for the next several months, the
success of the industry’s compliance program may directly influence the
need and/or desire for Congress to enact formal legislation.238 At the very
least, the success of the industry’s compliance program will determine
234

See id.

235

The BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777 § 302(a), 111th Cong. (as reported by H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, July 19, 2010).
236

Id. § 302(b).

237

See infra Part IV.B. The Commerce Department also promoted accountability in it
recent green paper, encouraging companies to conduct “privacy impact assessments
(PIAs)” to “identify and evaluate privacy risks arising from the use of personal
information.” COMMERCE DEP’T PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 34.
238

See Juliana Gruenwald, Finding Common Ground, but No Agreement, TECH DAILY
DOSE (Sept. 24, 2010, 10:21 AM) [hereinafter Gruenwald, Finding Common Ground],
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/09/finding-common-ground-but-no-a.php;
Juliana Gruenwald, Privacy Likely to Remain on Agenda in House Next Year, TECH
DAILY DOSE (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/
2010/09/privacy-likely-to-remain-on-ag.php; Kashmir Hill, Future of Privacy Forum
Founder Does Not Expect Online Privacy Bills to Pass This Year, Comment to The NotSo Private Parts, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/
kashmirhill/2010/09/15/future-of-privacy-forum-head-does-not-expect-online-privacybills-to-pass-this-year/?boxes=Homepagechannels.
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whether the legislation, if enacted, might actually change how companies
protect consumer privacy online.
B. Industry Efforts to Enhance Self-Regulation
of Online Behavioral Advertising
[57] Although the advertising and media industries first implemented
their Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising in July
2009,239 critics argue that the self-regulatory model has not been
effective.240 Moreover, until recently, the industry had taken no real
action in response to the FTC’s directives to increase transparency and
provide consumers with more control over the collection of data regarding
their online activities.241
[58] Following the introduction of the Boucher-Stearns Privacy
Discussion Draft and the BEST PRACTICES Act, however, several
advertising industry trade associations announced a new coalition, the
Digital Advertising Alliance, formed to oversee a new phase in the
industry’s self-regulatory efforts.242 As part of the new initiative, the
239

See generally Industry Guidelines, supra note 150150, at 12-18.

240

See Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary
Codes 9-12 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-16,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrm?abstractid=1510275.
241

See Robert D. Forbes, Update: Internet Advertising Groups Launch Self-Regulation
Program, Comment to Privacy Law Blog, PROSKAUER (Oct. 5, 2010, 11:51 AM),
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2010/10/articles/behavioral-marketing/update-internetadvertising-groups-launch-selfregulation-program/ [hereinafter Forbes, Update]; Tanzina
Vega, Ad Group Unveils Plan to Improve Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/media/04privacy.html [hereinafter Vega,
Ad Group].
242

Wendy Davis, Industry Coalition Bows Self-Regulation Info Web Site, Readies New
Trade
Organization,
MEDIAPOSTNEWS
(Sept.
30,
2010,
7:08
PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=136831
[hereinafter Davis, Industry Coalition]. The “Digital Advertising Alliance” is currently
comprised of seven trade associations, including the Interactive Advertising Bureau,
American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Advertising Federation,
Association of National Advertisers, Better Business Bureau, Direct Marketing
Association, and the Network Advertising Initiative. Id.
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Digital
Advertising
Alliance
launched
a
website:
http://www.aboutads.info.243 Among other things, the website displays the
Industry Guidelines for self-regulation in online behavioral advertising,
offers information to companies about how to register for the selfregulatory compliance program, and, most importantly, educates
consumers about what online behavioral advertising is and how they can
control the collection of data regarding their online activity.244
[59] Principally, this phase of the industry’s self-regulation efforts
promotes the use of a universal icon, the “Power I,” that publishers and
advertisers can place inside advertisements to inform consumers about
when behavioral tracking is taking place.245 When consumers click on the
icon, they “will be directed to a page explaining why they are seeing a
particular advertisement and how to opt out of being tracked online.”246
This use of an icon:
[R]epresents a major shift in how consumers are notified
about a company’s use of behavioral advertising.
Historically, sites have included notice of their practices
and consumers’ choice with respect to them solely within
their privacy policies. With the icon, both notice and choice
will be presented in a far more clear and conspicuous
manner.247
243

DIGITAL ADVERTISING ALLIANCE, http://www.aboutads.info/ (last visited May. 9,
2011).
244

See id.

245

See Forbes, Update, supra note 241. The “Power I” icons are blue triangles, similar to
“play” buttons, with the letter placed in the center, and are expected to go live on
websites that comply with the program’s requirements in the near future. See Davis,
Industry Coalition, supra note 244.
246

Forbes, Update, supra note 241.

247

REED FREEMAN, JR., ET AL., MORRISON & FOERSTER, MORRISON & FOERSTER CLIENT
ALERT: INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS LAUNCH BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING SELF
REGULATORY PROGRAM INVOLVING ICON, 2 (2010) [hereinafter MOFO CLIENT ALERT],
available
at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/101006-BehavioralAdvertising.pdf.
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In addition, the language on the Digital Advertising Alliance’s website is
clearer than the traditional “legalese” included in online privacy
policies.248
[60] “The compliance program, like the self-regulatory principles, is
part of the industry’s effort to demonstrate that no new privacy laws are
needed.”249
Companies will instead be incentivized to maintain
compliance with Industry Guidelines in exchange for use of the “Power I”
icon on their website.250 In fact, before a company can include the “Power
I” icon in advertisements it distributes or posts on its website, the coalition
requires a third party “Approved Provider” to ensure that the entity
complies with the self-regulatory principles in the Industry Guidelines.251
To participate in the compliance program, companies must also pay a
registration fee and make a commitment, which may be enforceable by the
FTC, to comply with the Industry Guidelines.252 The Digital Advertising
Alliance is not the only industry-generated effort to ensure compliance

248

Compare Understanding Online Advertising, THE SELF REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, http://www.aboutads.info/consumers/ (last visited
April 16, 2011), with In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 451-66, 2004 WL
5662254, at *4 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 2004) (containing Gateway’s online privacy policies).
249

Davis, Industry Coalition, supra note 242.

250

See id.

251

See Advertising Option Icon Application, THE SELF REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, http://www.aboutads.info/participants/icon (last
visited April 16, 2011) (instructing that a company must acquire the approval of an
Approved Provider as evidence of compliance). Better Advertising was the first
company designated as an Approved Provider to enforce compliance with the SelfRegulatory Principles of the Digital Advertising Alliance; see, e.g. Davis, Industry
Coalition, supra note 241; Press Release, EVIDON, Digital Advertising Alliance
Endorses Better Advertising as the First Approved Technology Provider for Industry
Self-Regulatory Program (October 10, 2010), available at http://www.evidon.com/
releases/daa_release.
252

MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 3.
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with the FTC and Industry Guidelines.253 Unlike the Digital Advertising
Alliance’s initiative, which is a non-profit coalition of industry trade
organizations,254 TRUSTe is a for-profit company that has also created an
icon-based compliance program for online advertisers.255
[61] TRUSTe is a company that monitors the privacy policies of
various websites to determine if they are adequate.256 Once a privacy
policy is certified, TRUSTe allows the website to place an icon on the
website’s home page.257 Because of its background with privacy policies
and compliance, TRUSTe has recently created a similar compliance
program for the advertising industry, TRUSTed Ads.258 Like the Digital
Advertising Alliance’s program, the TRUSTed Ads program utilizes an
icon, which consumers can click on to access information regarding data
collection for behavioral targeting purposes and “an easy-to-use opt-out
option.”259 However, unlike the “Power I” icon, which will appear inside
an advertisement,260 the TRUSTed Ads icon will appear adjacent to the
advertisement.261 Therefore, consumers might not notice the TRUSTed
Ads icon as easily as the “Power I” icon because, theoretically, an icon

253

See, e.g., Tom Foremski, TRUSTe Tries to Manage the Massive Problem of Internet
User Privacy, ZDNET BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010, 5:05 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
foremski/truste-tries-to-manage-the-massive-problem-of-internet-user-privacy/1523.
254

See Davis, Industry Coalition, supra note 242.

255

See Foremski, supra note 253.

256

Id.

257

Id.

258

See Press Release, TRUSTe, TRUSTe Launches TRUSTed Ads Privacy Platform
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/TRUSTeLaunches-TRUSTed-Ads-Privacy-Platform-1329164.htm.
259

Id.

260

See Forbes, Update, supra note 241.

261

See Press Release, TRUSTe, supra note 258.
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that is out-of-place in a regular advertisement would stand out more than
an icon placed outside the advertisement’s border.
[62] These efforts at increased self-regulation have received
considerable support from the industry, particularly in light of its desire to
avoid regulation.262
However, critics of self-regulation remain
unconvinced, calling this effort “the latest version in a long series of failed
self-regulatory efforts” and asking “the government to step in and set rules
for the industry.”263 Despite the lack of enthusiasm among privacy
watchdogs and regulators about the industry’s recent efforts to further the
self-regulatory model, recent studies suggest that this program could be
the perfect middle ground.264 First, Evidon (formerly Better Advertising),
one of the companies enforcing compliance with the Digital Advertising
Alliance’s program,265 released a research study examining how
consumers interacted with advertisements containing the “Power I” icon
and how that interaction affected their views of the brand advertised.266
The study confirmed that consumers do, in fact, have a strong desire for
the transparency in data collection practices and control over their
information that the FTC and the Industry Self-Regulatory Guidelines call
262

See Vega, Ad Group, supra note 241 (describing how members of the industry as “a
big step forward,” but “privacy advocates say self-regulation is not enough”).
263

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

264

See Scott Klass, Research: Consumers Feel Better About Brands that Give Them
Transparency and Control over Ads, EVIDON BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:30 PM),
http://blog.evidon.com/2010/11/10/research-consumers-feel-better-about-brands-thatgive-them-transparency-and-control-over-ads/; Tanzina Vega, Studies Find Success in
Use of Privacy Icons, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 9:00 AM)
[hereinafter Vega, Studies], http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/studiesfind-success-in-use-of-privacy-icons/; see also John Eggerton, Brill: FTC Will Monitor
Behavioral Ad Self-Regs, MULTICHANNEL NEWS BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:41 AM),
http://www.multichannel.com/article/458855-Brill_FTC_Will_Monitor_Behavioral_Ad
_Self_Regs.php.
265

Scott, Better Advertising’s Assurance Platform Endorsed by Digital Advertising
Alliance,
EVIDON
BLOG
(Oct.
4,
2010,
11:30
AM),
http://blog.evidon.com/2010/10/04/better-advertisings-assurance-platform-endorsed-bythe-digital-advertising-alliance/.
266

See Klass, supra note 265.
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for.267 For example, 76 percent of consumers wanted information about
which companies were involved in targeting advertisements they
received.268 In addition, nearly 90 percent of respondents also wanted full
control over their information (i.e., they “want to be able to pick and
choose which individual companies to opt out of.”).269
[63] Nonetheless, the Evidon/Better Advertising study also revealed
that consumers responded positively to the “Power I” icon, with 67
percent of consumers “feel[ing] better about brands when they [were]
given more ‘control’ by those brands, including the ability to opt out” of
having their data collected.270 Likewise, 36 percent of participants stated
they were more likely to purchase products from brands that were
transparent about their data collection practices.271
[64] However, the highlight of the study for members of the behavioral
advertising industry was that even if consumers viewed the “Power I” icon
in their ads and received a clear opportunity to opt-out, the opt-out rate
was “extremely low [at] 0.0001 percent.”272 Essentially, after learning
about behavioral targeting associated with a given advertisement, only one
person in every thousand consumers chose not to allow online advertisers
to continue collecting his data.273 As a result, the survey’s coordinators
argued that the participation in the Digital Advertising Alliance’s program
would not hurt online advertisers; in fact, the study showed that
267

See id; see also FTC SELF-REGULATORY GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 46 (stating that
behavioral advertisers should “provide a clear, concise, consumer-friendly, and
prominent statement” about the types of data collected and information about how
consumers can opt-out of having their data collected); Industry Guidelines, supra note
150, at 2-3, 12-14.
268

Klass, supra note 264.

269

Id.

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

Id.

273

Klass, supra note 264.
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“providing evidence of compliance” with the FTC and Industry Guidelines
“can build brands and help generate [a] better ROI [return on
investment].”274
[65] Similarly, a second research study, conducted jointly by TRUSTe
and the Publishers Clearing House, examined the effectiveness of the
TRUSTed Ads program.275 For the study, TRUSTe placed its TRUSTed
Ads icon near ads displayed on a Publishers Clearing House website.276
Clicking on the icon placed near the ad redirected consumers to a website
that explained targeted advertisements and offered consumers a means to
learn more about the ads as well as an opportunity to opt-out of receiving
them.277
[66] First, the study revealed that people were much more likely to click
on the TRUSTed Ads icon than they were to click on a website’s privacy
policy.278 Second, the study also showed that “more than half of the
people who saw the icon and clicked through” found the information
about the targeting advertisements “helpful.”279 Finally, like the Better
Advertising study, only a small percentage of visitors exercised the option
to opt-out of all behavioral targeting.280
[67] Although the results of these studies seem focused on garnering
additional participation in the self-regulatory programs by members of the

274

Id.

275

Press Release, TRUSTe, supra note 258; Vega, Studies, supra note 264.

276

Vega, Studies, supra note 264.

277

Id.

278

Id. (“The click-through rate on the icon was 2.5 percent higher than the click-through
rate on privacy policies.”).
279

Id.

280

Id. (“[V]ery few visitors, 1.1 percent, chose to opt out of all advertising networks.”).
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behavioral advertising industry,281 they also represent a clear attempt to
demonstrate that privacy legislation is still premature. In fact, these
studies reflect increasing efforts by members of the behavioral advertising
industry to show the government that the use of in-ad icons could be the
most effective means of informing consumers about advertisers’ data
collection practices, giving them a real opportunity to control the
collection and use of their information without hindering innovation.282
C. The Industry’s New Self-Regulatory Programs Expand the FTC’s Role
and Make Recently Proposed Privacy Bills Unnecessary
[68] Though privacy advocates continue to insist that legislation is
necessary to provide adequate protection for online consumer privacy, the
industry’s recent efforts to improve the self-regulatory model offer the
FTC a new opportunity to bring enforcement actions against online
advertisers, without the aid of formal regulation.283 Currently, the FTC
does not bring enforcement actions against online behavioral advertisers if
they disclose the collection and use of data about consumers’ online
activities in their privacy policies.284 Therefore, they are not engaging in a
deceptive practice, unless they misinform or mislead customers about how
they collect or use that information.285 In addition, it is difficult for the
FTC to utilize its unfairness authority to attack behavioral advertising,
because although consumers may suffer some abstract harm due to the
collection of information about their online activity, consumers do receive
281

See, e.g., Vega, Studies, supra note 264 (quoting TRUSTe’s President, who stated,
“This [study] is to tell Industry, ‘Do a good job on this, because [it’s] really not going to
hurt your business.’”).
282

See generally Klass, supra note 264; Vega, Studies, supra note 264.

283

See MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 3 (noting that the downside of
participating in the industry’s compliance program is that the commitment to abide by the
Industry’s Self-Regulatory Guidelines is an enforceable agreement subject to
enforcement under § 5 of the FTC Act); Vega, Ad Group, supra note 241.
284

See note 78 and accompanying text.

285

See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 474-75, 2004 WL 5662254
(F.T.C. Sept. 10, 2004).
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an offsetting benefit – like the ability to read online newspapers without a
paid subscription.286
[69] However, by participating in either of the industry’s compliance
programs and placing icons in or near advertisements they publish or
distribute, companies that engage in behavioral advertising will be making
material representations to the public that their data collection practices
comply with the Industry (and, effectively, the FTC) Guidelines.287
Therefore, if a company displays either the “Power I” or TRUSTed Ads
icon and, in fact, fails to comply with the privacy principles set forth in the
FTC and Industry Guidelines, the FTC can bring an enforcement action
against the entity under its authority to prohibit deceptive practices.288
[70] Using similar reasoning, the FTC has brought numerous
enforcement actions against companies that have asserted compliance with
the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement in their website’s privacy policy and,
yet, failed to remain compliant with the program.289 “The U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor Framework provides a method for U.S. companies to transfer
personal data outside of Europe that is consistent with the requirements of

286

See JOHN BATTELLE, supra note 42, at 194 (describing behavioral advertising as the
“quid pro quo” for free online services); HARBOUR CONCURRENCE, supra note 12, at 1
(acknowledging that consumers receive access to numerous, “free” online services in
exchange for the collection of personal information); see also infra Part III.C.1.
287

See MOFO CLIENT ALERT, supra note 247, at 4; see also FTC Statement on Deception,
supra note 99, at *192 (stating that an express claim is necessarily material under the
FTC’s deception authority because companies do not include material in advertising
unless it is likely to affect a consumer’s choice).
288

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). See generally FTC Statement on Deception, supra note 99,
at *167-93.
289

See, e.g., In re Collectify LLC, No. 092-3142, 2009 WL 3239634 (F.T.C. Oct. 6,
2009); In re Directors Desk LLC, No. 092-3140, 2009 WL 3239632 (F.T.C. Oct. 6,
2009); In re Expatedge Partners, LLC, No. 092-3138, 2009 WL 3239629 (F.T.C. Oct. 6,
2009); In re Onyx Graphics, Inc., No. 092-3139, 2009 WL 3239631 (F.T.C. Oct. 6,
2009); In re Progressive Gaitways LLC, No. 092-3141, 2009 WL 3239633 (F.T.C. Oct.
6, 2009); In re World Innovators, Inc., No. 092-3137, 2009 WL 3239628 (F.T.C. Oct. 6,
2009).
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the European Union Directive on Data Protection (“Directive”).”290 The
Directive, which became effective in 1998, is a comprehensive approach
to privacy legislation that, ordinarily, would prevent companies from
transferring personal data to non-European Union nations unless those
nations met European standards for consumer privacy protection.291
However, to ensure that U.S. companies could:
[S]atisfy the EU adequacy standard for certain commercial
transfers, the U.S. Department of Commerce . . . and the
[European Commission] negotiated the U.S.-EU Safe
Harbor Framework, which went into effect in 2000. The
Safe Harbor allows U.S. companies to transfer personal
data lawfully from the EU. To join the Safe Harbor, a
company must self-certify to Commerce that it complies
with seven principles and related requirements that have
been deemed to meet the EU’s adequacy standard.292
[71] As part of the Safe Harbor program, the Department of Commerce
maintains a website, which lists all the companies who have notified the
agency of past or current compliance with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor
Framework.293 “An organization’s self-certification . . . and its appearance
on this list pursuant to the self certification, constitute a representation to
the Department of Commerce and the public that it adheres to a privacy
policy that meets the safe harbor framework.”294 If a company self290
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certifies to the Department of Commerce that its privacy practices comply
with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, then the certification lasts for a
twelve-month period; however, the company must re-certify its
compliance each year to remain “current.”295 In addition, next to each
company on the Safe Harbor List, the Department displays information
about whether the company has a current self-certification on file with the
agency.296
[72] The FTC has authority to enforce compliance with the U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor Framework under Section 5 of the FTC Act.297 As previously
mentioned, the Act provides that all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce” are illegal.298 In addition, the FTC Act also
gives the agency plenary power to bring enforcement actions against
companies that engage in practices the Act proscribes.299 Using this
authority, the FTC has brought numerous enforcement actions against
companies that have engaged in “deceptive practices” by falsely asserting
compliance with the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework.300
[73] For example, in 2009, the FTC filed an action against Progressive
Gaitways, LLC for violating the FTC Act in connection with the U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor Framework.301 Progressive sold medical equipment online
and, as early as 2007, began representing in its websites’ privacy policies
295
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15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

299

See id. § 45(a)(2), (b).

300
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that it participated in the Safe Harbor program.302 However, although
Progressive filed its self-certification of compliance with the Safe Harbor
in 2004 and re-certified in 2005, it failed to renew its self-certification in
2006 and, thus, was listed on the Commerce Department’s Safe Harbor
List as “not current.”303 Consequently, because Progressive made material
representations in its online privacy policies that it actively participated in
the Safe Harbor program, when, in fact, it did not,304 the FTC alleged that
Progressive had engaged in a deceptive practice, in violation of the FTC
Act.305 Eventually, the FTC and Progressive negotiated a consent decree,
under which Progressive agreed to refrain from making similar
misrepresentations regarding its participation in any government and/or
third party compliance programs in the future.306
[74] Like the FTC’s Safe Harbor enforcement actions, even without the
aid of additional privacy legislation, the agency can still bring
enforcement actions against website operators and online behavioral
advertisers that “mislead consumers about privacy . . . by failing to honor
their privacy polices [as in Gateway], or circumventing users’ opt-out
preferences by, say, using Flash cookies to recreate deleted HTTP
cookies.”307 Similarly, if a company represents through the use of
“Power I” or TRUSTed Ads icons that they have complied with both the
FTC and Industry Guidelines for the collection and use of data regarding
consumers’ online activities, the FTC can bring an enforcement action
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against the entity under its authority to attack deceptive practices, if the
company, in fact, fails to comply with the self-regulatory framework.308
[75] Thus, because of the online advertising industry’s new compliance
programs, the FTC’s enforcement authority allows the agency to ensure
that online behavioral advertisers comply with the self-regulatory
principles.309 As a result, the Boucher-Stearns Privacy Discussion Draft,
the BEST PRACTICES Act, and similar privacy bills, if passed, will do
nothing more than formalize the privacy framework already in place
through the industry’s enhanced version of self-regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
[76] The existing system of self-regulation allows the FTC to utilize a
flexible approach to enforcement as new technologies and methods of
behavioral advertising increase in popularity and create privacy
concerns.310 In addition, the advertising industry has only recently taken
steps to ensure that its members comply with the FTC’s self-regulatory
model.311 Thus, even though privacy advocates argue that it took the
industry too long to take online consumer privacy seriously, regulators
should wait and see if the industry’s efforts are successful in creating
widespread transparency regarding online advertisers’ data collection
practices. The FTC should also give the industry time to educate
consumers, by providing clear privacy notices and showing consumers
how they can control how data about their online activities is collected and
used. At best, the recently-introduced privacy bills are likely to maintain
the status quo; but, at worst, the bills could increase litigation and
uncertainty costs for online advertisers and, as a result, stifle innovation.
[77] Therefore, the FTC should seize the opportunity the advertising
industry’s new compliance programs present. The agency should
308
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encourage all members of the online advertising industry to participate in
these programs, work with the industry’s existing initiatives to educate
consumers about online privacy, and, finally, bring additional enforcement
actions against online behavioral advertisers using their existing power to
combat unfair and deceptive commercial practices. Based on recent
industry efforts, the FTC can do all of these things now without the aid of
additional rule-making authority or the assistance of new privacy
legislation.
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